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In the development literature, there exists no systematic study of external borrowing in 
post-conflict countries. We address this gap by analyzing statistical and case study 
evidence from three African countries. We find that many war-affected countries face 
rising debt arrears and deteriorating relations with creditors. Rebuilding trust between 
lenders and borrowers is hence a crucial but often slow process. Furthermore, donors to 
war-affected African countries have been slow to grant exceptional debt relief based 
odious debt or on financial requirements. Debt relief for post-conflict reconstruction 
should embrace a more forward-looking and more generous conditionality. 
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1  1. INTRODUCTION 
External borrowing is a core element in nearly all poor countries’ development 
strategies, including almost all war-affected developing countries. Foreign loans can be 
used to finance public spending aimed at increasing growth, development and security. 
However, external borrowing can also be used for private gains or for financing 
warfare. Similarly, overcoming conflict requires raising and redirecting scarce public 
finances, including borrowed funds, from war-related activities towards sustainable 
development. Both processes - using external borrowing wisely and building peace - are 
massive challenges for poor countries and donors alike. 
Despite substantial research on external debt management in general and on post-war 
reconstruction in developing countries, surprisingly few studies have addressed the 
external debt held by post-conflict countries. Given the special problems faced by 
countries at war or emerging from war, and the importance of external debt to the post-
war transition in these countries, it is useful to assess the case for special debt 
management strategies and for above average debt relief for post-conflict economies. A 
key motivation for this study is that unresolved debt issues in the post-war conflict can 
significantly hinder the international community’s commitment to reconstruction and 
limit the scale of its involvement. There is then a real risk that a lack of unresolved debt 
issues leads to underinvestment in peace and development and hence to a resumption of 
conflict. In short, external debt can be one of the causes of the conflict trap. 
Our paper analyses three related issues. First, we survey recent trends of external 
borrowing for conflict-affected countries and ask if these trends can be explained by the 
special burdens and needs of these countries. We will thus explain how post-conflict 
countries indeed are different from non-conflict economies. Second, we examine policy 
options concerning debt forgiveness (based both on wider moral and narrower economic 
concerns) and the effects of external borrowing on aid for post-conflict economies. This 
part of the analysis will thus probe into questions of policy design including the choice 
of indicators of debt sustainability, debt conditionality, and additionality. Third, we 
investigate the institutional framework of post-conflict debt management, from both the 
lender and the borrower perspectives. This issue includes a focus on the critical lender-
borrower relationship at the end of conflict (when arrears threaten to prevent the 
reintegration of the former war economy into the international donor framework) and an 
2 assessment of the suitability of international debt institutions for coping with debt under 
conflict. 
Our analysis draws on literature from the distinct fields of external borrowing and post-
conflict reconstruction, aggregate quantitative evidence covering all developing 
countries, and country case study evidence. We structure our analysis along the three 
perspectives of historical context, policy options, and institutional framework, 
supporting our general findings on each issue with case study evidence from three 
highly indebted poor post-conflict economies in Africa. The choice of country case 
studies for this paper was motivated by their diverse experience of conflict funded by 
debt (in the case of Mozambique), piece-meal debt relief policies being negotiated over 
years, using up scarce domestic capacities (in the case of Uganda), and unusual post-
war institutional relations (in the case of the DRC), thus mirroring the experience of 
many war-affected economies, even if that part of our analysis is not statistically 
representative. 
From a historical perspective, we demonstrate that the post-conflict environment poses 
special challenges and experiences unique circumstances concerning debt, arrears and 
aid as well as trust and institutional relations. Mozambique serves as an example of how 
war and debt are strongly intertwined, calling into question the responsibilities of the 
donor community in forgiving badly lent debt. 
From a policy perspective, we identify the shortcomings of existing analytical and 
policy approaches to dealing with highly indebted wartime economies. We sketch how 
protracted the debt relief process has been for Uganda, thus squandering the opportunity 
to accelerate post-war reconstruction by denying the special circumstances of indebted 
post-war countries. 
From an institutional perspective, we derive the need for a coherent and consistent 
approach to post-war reconstruction, where debt policy and debt management are but 
one strand of a successful transition from war to peace. The case of the DRC indicates 
how very worthwhile efforts in debt accounting can be lost if not met by similar 
progress on other macro-economic or poverty alleviation policies. The challenge for 
donor policy coherence is massive in the field of post-war debt management as well. 
Having said this, we acknowledge that some of these issues are of a normative 
character. In our study we emphasize the positive criteria and choices involved in these 
decision making processes. We do not argue that war-affected economies follow 
3 different laws of economics. Instead, our analysis identifies many similarities between 
developing countries with or without conflict. However, conflict sharpens the related 
debt and development challenges, thus raising the stakes and requiring even more 
focused and sustained policy responses. In short, we argue that what is a good debt 
policy for war-affected countries may also be a good debt policy for other developing 
countries, but that the reverse is not always true. 
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 to 4 provide a conceptual framework for 
the analysis of post-conflict debt drawing on recent trends, analyzing debt institutions 
and policies for debt relief. Section 5 assesses the experiences of three case studies 
(Mozambique, Uganda and the DRC) to indicate how recent trends, institutions and 
policies have been developed and applied in each of these three cases. Section 6 
concludes and derives some policy recommendations. 
2. ARE POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES DIFFERENT? 
Aggregate Trends 
Table 1a summarizes some salient features of recent trends in external borrowing for 38 
war-affected and peace-time economies, comparing debt indicators for low-income 
countries at war, post-war low-income countries, and low-income countries which did 
not experienced war in the preceding 12 years. The data on debt and aid are derived 
from the Word Bank’s GDF and WDI statistics. They are based on all severely and 
moderately indebted low income countries (LIC) for which data were available. 
Debt stocks as a share of GNI have remained fairly constant for most low-income 
countries (LICs) since 1990. LICs at war, however, have experienced above average 
and rising indebtedness in the late 1990s. LICs emerging from war were able to reduce 
their debt levels since 1995, possibly because of debt rescheduling and forgiveness. 
Given the weak export performance of war-affected countries, both war-time and post-
war LICs have much higher debt-to-export ratios than peace-time economies. The 
position of the post-war economies in this regard has, however, been improving steadily 
over time and converging with the overall mean in recent years. Foreign aid to post-
conflict countries in absolute terms is lower than aid given to countries at war or at 
peace. However, in relation to their GNI, post-conflict countries receive the highest 
amount of aid on average while countries currently affected by war receive the least 
support. 
4 The sources of official debt between conflict-affected and peace-time economies have 
changed over time (Table 1b). Conflict-affected countries (including both war-time and 
post-war countries) doubled the share of debt from multilateral creditors in the period 
1990 to 2002 while peace-time economies only raised that share by 50 per cent. In turn, 
conflict-affected countries reduced their share of bilateral debt by a quarter while peace-
time economies reduced that share by only ten per cent. By 2002, the conflict-affected 
countries have less debt as a share of total debt with bilateral official creditors than does 
the reference group. This also implies that, for better or for worse, bilateral donors have 
less influence on policy conditionality in these countries vis-à-vis the multilateral 
lenders. At the same time, this trend heightens the need to monitor and optimize 
multilateral policies for war-affected countries. 
In summary, the data indicate that during a war debt levels rise and after a war debt 
levels fall. Debt sustainability indicators worsen for two reasons during war: debt levels 
rise and indicators of economic activity worsen. Furthermore, debt for conflict-affected 
countries has been multilateralised over the last fifteen years, with bilateral lenders 
strongly reducing their exposure to war-affected economies. These data hence 
demonstrate that war-affected countries do indeed have different trends with respect to 
their foreign debt than do peace-time countries. 
Arrears with Multilateral Donors 
Post-conflict countries with external debt arrears face severe difficulties to accessing 
much needed funds from the international community as the international community is 
not usually willing to lend or donate to countries in arrears on debt. For multilateral 
donors, arrears are a problem as they signal the end of business as usual for assistance to 
a country (Birdsall et al. 2003). Re-establishing a working institutional relationship 
between a highly indebted war-affected developing country on the one hand and the 
multilateral institutions on the other hand is thus crucial for resolving a debt crisis. 
Bilateral donors respect the primacy of multilateral donors in this respect and treat 
breaches of contract by borrowers with multilateral creditors as a signal that contracts 
with bilateral creditors will not be honored any further, either. However, the issue of 
how to deal with countries in arrears is not yet well established by the international 
community. Furthermore, war-affected countries find this process even more 
challenging than other developing countries. 
5 Normalizing relations with multilateral donors in a post-war setting generally requires 
six steps. First, an indebted country must form a working an internationally recognized 
government, thus articulating a functioning voice in this process. Second, the 
government must establish the domestic political will to normalizing relations and build 
up some minimal managerial capacity for debt management. This last part is 
particularly difficult for war-affected countries. Third, the country, assisted by the 
international community such as the IMF, must undertake a stocktaking exercise (also 
called “debt reconciliation”) to establish the level, the nature and the lenders of the 
outstanding stock of foreign debt. Post-war countries may face problems in completing 
this step if records were lost during the war (as happened in Liberia). 
Fourth, a country has to formally re-establish its relations with the IMF and other 
international donors and their agencies to start building some trust. Trust may be built 
up, for example, by starting nominal but regular payments to an international financial 
institution. Fifth, the government has to develop a national debt management policy and 
start implementing this policy with its partners. This should address in particular the 
issue of arrears. Without starting to clear arrears, a developing country cannot re-
establish working relations with the international donor community. Finally, the 
government can enter into debt relief negotiations with its Paris Club and non-Paris 
Club donors. 
Arrears to international financial institutions may delay the commencement of peace 
building (beyond the signing of the peace deal) and postpone reconstruction unless a 
post-war government succeeds in obtaining bridge loans from bilateral official creditors. 
Bridge loans are very short-term loans, often only lasting a few days, by bilateral 
lenders to developing countries keen to fulfill their obligations to multilateral 
institutions but unable to do so from their own resources. Once the multilateral lending 
resumes upon receipt of the bridge loan, the resources from the multilateral loan can 
then be used to repay the bridge loan - potentially leaving an indebted country 
financially no better off than before. Surprisingly, bridge loans by bilateral donors 
appear to help governments gain credibility with multilateral donors.  
The paradox of bridge loans is that they allow a developing country to gain short-term 
credibility by appearing more financially liquid than they are. However, the multilateral 
lender knows that this creation of liquidity is an artifact, established by willing donors. 
The benefits of bridge loans entail the resumption of multilateral lending in the longer 
term, the commitment of bilateral donors to that country and the prevention of a 
6 significant loss of reputation associated with default to international lenders. The costs 
of bridge loans include the burden on capacity by donors and recipients to arrange the 
bridge loans and the financial cost of such short-term lending. 
An innovative approach to overcoming large and protracted arrears to the multilateral 
institutions by post-conflict countries was developed by IDA in 1999 (Michailof et al. 
2002). The IDA authorized the limited use of grant financing to support economic 
recovery during the pre-arrears clearance phase. However, by 2001 only one out of the 
five post-conflict countries in Africa with large and protracted arrears that could have 
qualified for these IDA grants did in deed qualify, namely the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Therefore, arrears continue to be a key obstacle to establishing sustainable and 
workable debt management strategies for post-conflict economies. 
Exceptional Burdens and Needs 
War-affected economies can be expected to carry extra burdens in terms of their 
development agenda as a result of excessive, war-induced mortality, morbidity and 
refugee movements, excessive asset destruction, capital depreciation and capital flight, 
possibly inflation, a large trade deficit and a considerable budget deficit. This war-
induced burden is sharpened further by the fact that post-conflict countries have weaker 
institutions and capacities for raising domestic debt, for negotiating external financial 
support, and for coordinating aid than do other developing countries. This is related to 
the fact that rebels often target the effectiveness of the government, thus leaving a post-
war government weak in areas like tax collection. Having less remaining debt (or at 
least having comprehensive debt restructuring) lowers the burden on constantly re-
negotiating debt service in future years. Mozambique is a good example of how such 
negotiations can absorb much time and efforts of the indebted country (see below). 
Furthermore, expectations are crucial for the success of post-war transition. Negative 
expectations about the prospects of peace can damage the peace process, reduce 
domestic consumption and investment, and prevent the return of flight capital, thus 
increasing the war-burden on the economy (Collier and Gunning 1995). Unresolved 
foreign debt represents unresolved donor relations, thus de-stabilizing international 
expectations and signaling the international critique of war-time or post-war-time 
macro-economic conditions. 
In addition to having higher burdens, post-war countries have high financing needs for 
the (re-) construction of public goods, for the provision of public infrastructure and for 
7 current expenditure. This is composed both of the costs of making peace, such as 
demobilization programs, and the costs of establishing working institutions. Thus, post-
conflict countries have higher financing needs than even other developing countries 
with a similar output but not carrying the burdens of previous war. This implies a 
further case for debt relief for post-conflict economies, which will be addressed in the 
next section. 
3. DEBT RELIEF AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
In the sparse literature on external debt policy in post-conflict economies, there are 
several arguments for deeper debt relief for post-conflict economies, including the 
exceptional burdens and needs of post-conflict economies as argued above, debt 
overhang effects, and odious debt. All these arguments favor early and significant debt 
relief to achieve a successful transition to peace and prosperity. However, the effects of 
debt relief for post-conflict economies will also depend on the scale of additionality, 
that is on the degree of substitution between debt and aid, which will be considered in 
this section as well. 
Debt Relief and Growth 
Moral hazard considerations would suggest that the prospect of eventual debt relief may 
induce a desire to contract high levels of debt by developing countries. It could be 
argued that in a conflict setting the moral hazard issue is heightened to the extent that 
governments may deliberately risk violent conflict as a way of achieving debt relief. 
However, while it appears plausible that in many countries (such as Mozambique) 
foreign debt was used to fund ongoing wars, there appears to be no case of a 
government starting war with the objective of achieving debt relief. Instead, military, 
political and other economic motives always appear to be leading determinants of 
conflict. While moral hazard may be an important issue in debt relief generally, it does 
not seem to be a special concern in the case of post-war debt relief. 
Debt relief might promote growth through three channels (Addison et al. 2004): by 
reducing uncertainty concerning debt repayments, by lowering the debt service 
payments (thus making additional resources available for public investment), and by 
reducing the debt overhang effect. For the post-war context, Menzies (2004) shows how 
a creditor pursuing the recovery of some debt and the attainment of humanitarian goals 
can balance these considerations within an optimal contract framework. Such 
framework must recognize the potential conflict between different policies, including 
8 the ending of a civil war. In a time-horizon relevant for many policymakers, the 
repayment of foreign creditors by post-war countries is a substitute for the attainment of 
peace. Thus, debt forgiveness could increase the chance of peace. 
Addison and Murshed (2003) argue that debt relief may reduce political grievances 
through broad-based public spending. This emphasizes the need to view economic and 
political processes jointly in the post-war period. Alternatively, debt relief could free 
resources to buy off the war party. However, even if debt relief were forthcoming, the 
fiscal system may be too degraded to achieve the promised transfer. Moreover, a given 
fiscal transfer that would have prevented war might be insufficient to achieve peace 
once war has started. The timing of debt relief is hence critical to achieving an effective 
macro-economic impact of debt relief. 
A country suffers from debt overhang if its debt is so large that the expected debt 
service costs will discourage further domestic and foreign investment (Sachs 1989). In 
the case of the highly-indebted, poor countries (HIPCs), debt relief may not stimulate 
investment and growth as these countries do not suffer from debt overhang. In fact, 
HIPC countries often receive positive net transfers from creditors rather than negative 
ones (Arslanalp and Henry 2004, Birdsall et al. 2003). However, as debt stocks are very 
high in these countries, the continued reliance on disbursements leaves these countries 
in a very perilous situation, with a high degree of policy uncertainty stemming from 
future donor behavior. A further obstacle to investment and growth in these countries 
derives from a lack of basic economic institutions. Therefore, the energy and resources 
devoted to the HIPC initiative could be more effectively employed as direct foreign aid. 
Despite the strong case for accelerated debt relief for post-conflict economies based on 
uncertainty or exceptional burdens, several authors demonstrate that much debt relief 
and aid is motivated by other, less altruistic reasons. Kanbur (2000), for example, views 
concerns over debt servicing to be a key reason for the failure to enforce conditionality. 
In accordance with Claessens et al. (1997) and Birdsall et al (2003), Kanbur also argues 
that foreign aid is often granted to ensure „normal relations” with regular debt servicing. 
This, however, also provides a safety net for private creditors and reduces the risk of 
lending to regimes that are not creditworthy. Addison and Murshed (2003) and Kanbur 
(2000) recommend that peace-building governments should receive faster debt relief, 
ensuring that peace is not delayed by the inevitable difficulties that wartime 
governments face in meeting donor policy conditionality. Therefore, debt relief should 
be monitored for its effect on growth, poverty reduction and peace building and to 
9 prevent it from being squandered on political donor priorities unrelated to genuine 
development objectives. 
Odious Debt and Debt Relief 
Odious debt, even though a normative issue, could be defined as debt incurred by a 
dictator not for the needs or in the interest of the society but to strengthen the despotic 
regime. This debt is not an obligation for the nation but it is the personal debt of that 
regime, consequently falling within its power. The interesting question from an 
economic point of view is how odious debt can arise in the first place, given that odious 
debt carries a high risk of default. 
There have been numerous approaches from legal and moral scholars to formulate a 
theory of odious debt (Hanlon 2006). One early approach dates back to Alexander Sack, 
a professor of law and former minister in the Tsarist government in the early 20
th 
century, who tried to formalize the legitimacy of foreign debt in light of the Bolsheviks 
repudiation of Russian debts after the Russian Revolution (Sack 1929). 
An alternative approach based to odious debt rests on two criteria. First, a regime must 
have the ability to use debt contrary to the interest of the population. This criterion 
shifts the responsibility for the debt from the overall population to the ruling regime 
alone. Second, the debt must pass a certain threshold to harm future economic 
development. If both conditions are fulfilled, it is very likely that at least part of the 
external debt is odious. 
In a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ndikumana and Boyce 
(1998) argue for debt relief based on the doctrine of odious debt. They review the 
evidence that the official and private creditors of the Mobutu regime knew, or should 
have known, that there was a high risk that their loans would not be used to benefit the 
Congolese people. Based on an estimate of capital flight, Ndikumana and Boyce 
conclude that during 1968 and 1990 Zaire was in fact a net creditor to the rest of the 
world, exporting more capital than it imported. 
Hence the way the debt was acquired and spent can determine if and how such debt 
should be repaid. For example, the relative generosity of the international donor 
community vis-à-vis the DRC in forgiving debt (see below) was also based implicitly 
on the notion that much of the DRC’s debt was odious. 
There are some historical precedents for the doctrine of “odious debt”, with a new 
government repudiating the debt accumulated by a previous regime. During the 
10 Spanish-American War in 1898, for example, Spain lent money to the Cuban regime for 
military expenditures. After its victory, the United States proclaimed that neither Cuba 
nor the US should be responsible for repaying the debt, as it did not benefit the people 
of Cuba but instead had only strengthened the old regime. In the Paris peace treaty, 
Spain ultimately acknowledged this debt being odious and accepted its repudiation. 
Another example is the Russian revolution in 1919, where the Soviet government 
repudiated the Tsarist debts on the same grounds. Similarly, in the Treaty of Versailles 
that same year, the Polish debts to Prussia were also repudiated under the odious debt 
doctrine.  
However, there is no internationally accepted institution with the authority to measure 
or to declare the “odiousness” of sovereign debt. Accepting unilateral repudiation of 
debt without the blessing of such an institution would further undermine efforts to 
strengthen the enforcement of international property rights and thus decrease the 
efficiency of intra- and inter-temporal trade. 
To prevent future odious debt from being contracted, an institution (such as the UN 
Security Council) might be given the authority to rate a sovereign state “odious”. Such 
institution could impose a loan sanction on governments that are in danger of immoral 
and excessive borrowing. All debt accumulated after this cut-off point would be deemed 
illegitimate and thus not repayable, which would decrease creditors’ incentive to lend to 
sanctioned regimes (Jayachandran and Kremer 2004). 
Debt Relief and Additionality 
Additionality exists if debt relief does not lead to lower levels of other non-debt-relief-
related aid flows (that is crowding out) for the debtor concerned. A broader definition of 
additionality would request debt relief to lead to greater aggregate resources being made 
available to the individual debtor receiving the relief. 
A difficulty in assessing additionality stems from the counterfactual challenge of how to 
estimate what would have happened to aid volumes (or other economic indicators 
generally) in the absence of debt relief (or in the absence of conflict). We assume that 
debt restructurings are additional if debt forgiveness and/or debt relief is positively 
correlated with aid, approximated through grants including technical cooperation, where 
our proxy for aid does not take into account the concessional loan disbursements. Table 
5 contains total debt forgiveness, total debt relief including reschedulings and the proxy 
11 for aid flows. In order to calculate these series, we used data from the Global 
Development Finance database. 
Overall, there is a positive and high correlation of 0.57 between debt rescheduling and 
debt forgiveness, pooling all the data in Table 5. The correlation coefficient for debt 
relief and grants for pooled data is also positive but only 0.16. In terms of additionality, 
this implies that grants and debt restructuring move in the same direction. The 
rescheduling-forgiveness additionality maybe more important in practice than the 
rescheduling-aid additionality. 
Using cross-country data, Hansen (2004) analyses the impact of both aid and external 
debt reduction on growth and investment. He argues that it is of particular interest to 
look at the impact on growth when both debt service payments and aid flows are 
reduced. Decreasing debt service payments that are accompanied by falling grant levels 
may have a negative impact on growth. Furthermore, aid additionality can also enhance 
private sector confidence as investors observe that donors are committed to the country 
in the long-term. Thus, additionality seems to play an important role for the beneficial 
effect of debt relief on growth. 
Ndikumana (2002) examines in an econometric analysis whether and to what extent 
debt relief has been accompanied by decreasing development aid flows, grants, and 
other forms of concessional external financing. Using both data from the donor side and 
data from the recipient side enables him to analyze to what extent donors reduced their 
disbursements of ODA and grants following debt restructurings as well as to what 
extent countries that have received debt restructurings subsequently received less ODA 
and other forms of concessional development finance. While he finds that the supply of 
ODA and grants declined in the 1990s, he does not find a direct causal link between the 
volume of debt restructurings awarded and the volume of official development 
financing disbursed, which confirms our analysis of the data. 
4. INSTITUTIONS FOR POST-CONFLICT DEBT MANAGEMENT 
One of the important consequences of violent conflict at the field of international 
relations is the reduction of trust between lenders and borrowers. Given the need both to 
reconcile past loans and to effectively contract new loans or aid, both donors and 
recipients must work hard in the post-war period to re-establish trusting working 
relations. This section will inspect existing international institutional arrangements 
between lenders and war-affected borrowers. The analysis will reveal how little 
12 attention has been paid to post-conflict reconstruction by various international debt 
actors. 
Definitions 
‘Debt management’ refers both to the policies governments adopt to deal with debt and 
to the national capacity involved in planning and implementing a debt strategy. Debt 
can be reduced through different debt management strategies, including debt relief. 
‘Debt relief’ refers to steps that reduce the amounts of debt stocks owed and of debt 
service flows (that is, principal amortization and interest payments) paid by an indebted 
country to its creditors. Debt relief comes in two main forms: debt rescheduling and 
debt forgiveness. 
‘Debt rescheduling’ involves agreeing new repayment terms that shift debt repayment 
and debt service into the future, lowering the payments in the short-run. Debt can be 
rescheduled by private creditors and by official bilateral creditors; multilateral 
organizations do not reschedule debt. Debt rescheduling does not decrease the net 
present value of the debt stock. It might even increase the gross sum of the future flows 
of interest paid. Furthermore, the process of debt rescheduling may represent a drag on 
scarce administrative capacities in the debtor country. 
‘Debt forgiveness,’ as the name implies, involves a write-off of some portion or all of 
the debt. It is simply erased from the books, with the creditors taking the loss on their 
balance sheets. Debt can be forgiven by private creditors, by bilateral official donors 
and by multilateral donors. Private creditors may act individually or they may 
coordinate their debt forgiveness through the London Club. Bilateral official creditors 
can also either act unilaterally or in concert through the Paris Club. Multilateral lenders 
have forgiven debt for example as part of the HIPC initiative. The line between debt 
forgiveness and debt rescheduling is sometimes fuzzy, since rescheduling agreements 
may reduce total interest payments over the lifetime of the loan below those set forth in 
the original loan agreement. 
The main institutional arrangements for debt relief in the cases of commercial bank 
debt, bilateral debt, and multilateral debt held by developing countries are the London 
Club, the Paris Club, and the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, 
respectively. In these fora, creditors and the debtor government reach agreements on the 
type and amount of debt relief, and on the distribution of this relief among creditors. In 
addition, in cases where countries have suspended debt-service payments to multilateral 
13 creditors and accumulated arrears preventing new lending, special arrangements for 
clearing these arrears may also be devised. 
The London Club 
The so-called London Club has provided an ad-hoc forum for the negotiation of private 
commercial bank debt between one sovereign debtor and its creditors since the 1970s 
(IMF 2000). The aims of the Club are to ensure the equal treatment of private bank 
lenders by the borrower and to allow the borrower to regain credit worthiness in 
international financial markets. Usually this process is initiated by the debtor and is 
dissolved when the negotiations have been concluded; the process often occurs in 
parallel with the Paris Club negotiations. Since the 1980s, London Club bankers 
increasingly accepted terms which included partial forgiveness in exchange for an 
improved performance of repayment for the remaining debt. There is no explicit policy 
by the London Club on post-conflict debt, thus leaving such countries being treated on 
the same terms as peace time countries. 
Independent of London Club negotiations, private creditors have sold debt at discounted 
values on the secondary market. Various ‘buy-back’ schemes financed by bilateral or 
multilateral donors have enabled debtor countries to retire commercial debt at a fraction 
of its face value. Such schemes have also been implemented for post-conflict 
economies, as indicated by the cases of Mozambique and Uganda (see below). 
The Paris Club 
The most important institution for restructuring or rescheduling official bilateral debt is 
the Paris Club. Its main purpose has been to provide a framework for rescheduling 
sovereign debt between OECD creditor governments and low income countries since 
the mid-1950s. Only exceptionally (for example in the case of Uganda) does the Paris 
Club provide grants to help post-conflict countries service their multilateral debts. 
Occasionally, members of the Paris Club forgive debt unilaterally. For example, Canada 
announced bilateral debt write-offs ahead of the Cologne summit of G-8 countries, with 
its initiative being designed to exceed and augment the ongoing HIPC initiative and to 
shame other donors into concerted action (Pearson 2005). 
The emergence of alternative Non-Paris Club lenders such as China and Libya has 
complicated the bilateral debt negotiations and opens new financing opportunities for 
war-affected economies such as Sudan. On the one hand, Paris Club lenders find their 
bargaining power reduced. On the other hand, non-Paris Club lenders have to find 
14 alternative forms of effective sanctions, such as withholding investments or future 
loans, to enforce debt repayment. In part, these trends are driven by economic 
opportunities such as ensuring the mutual need to trade raw materials. The case of 
Sudan and China, or of Venezuelan oil exports, exemplifies this evolvement of new 
South-South trading relations where Sudan faces constraints in accessing traditional oil 
markets due to its ongoing conflicts and China utilizes this opportunity given its high 
resource needs (Patey 2006). 
The intensity of the Paris Club negotiation varies strongly across countries. In 
particular, there are significant gaps between meetings in time of war. For example, 
DRC was not considered by the Paris Club during its 5-year civil war. The timing of the 
meetings suggests that Paris Club agreements are partly driven by the perceived 
institutional and macro-economic ability of indebted countries to negotiate and 
implement a debt agreement, which may in part be a function of the generosity and 
scope of past Paris Club agreements. The Paris Club therefore is not a regular review 
body for discussing debt management policy and strategy. This implies that the Paris 
Club cannot be used to re-establish trust between conflict-affected countries and donors. 
Also, there is no element of peer review or best practice, which may provide early 
warning functions or exert peer pressure on lagging debtor countries, thus helping to 
develop internationals standards on dealing with debt in conflict economies. Only a 
small part of the debt stock is settled each time, leaving the need for future negotiations. 
In theory, it should be possible to avoid the need for repeated meetings and be possible 
to agree an exit rescheduling much earlier than is currently practiced, thus reducing the 
burden on scarce capacity in post-conflict economies. 
However, several trends prevent exit rescheduling from being agreed for war 
economies. First, donor interests in, attitude to and disbursements of aid towards war 
economies in recent years can be seen to be an exogenous political trend driven in part 
by civil society engagement in both North and South which emphasizes the 
humanitarian costs of conflict. Second, and related to the first point, the definition of 
sustainability has changed over time, as exemplified by the HIPC initiative which is 
slowly recognizing that post-conflict economies are indeed different (see below). Third, 
donors are concerned that moving to generous terms too quickly raises moral hazard 
problems for conflict economies (see below). Fourth, exogenous shocks (including 
renewed wars) may push the debt indicators of indebted countries back beyond a given 
and previously overcome threshold. Fifth, the special burdens and needs of post-war 
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to be reached which had not seemed possible before. Finally, the post-war capacity of 
indebted countries may rise over time, with the Paris Club expertise being built up. This 
may allow repeated participants in the Paris Club to build bargaining strength and hence 
achieve better deals over time. Thus the Paris Club has come to recognize that previous 
debt arrangements for post-conflict economies have not achieved sustainability, leading 
to improved terms. 
In the Paris Club, conditionality is provided by insisting on the existence of an IMF 
program which demonstrates the need for debt relief. If there is no agreement with the 
IMF (perhaps due to arrears), then the Paris Club will not provide debt relief. This 
emphasizes the importance of establishing functioning donor-recipient relations in the 
post-war period, as argued below. 
The HIPC Initiative 
The highly-indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative was conceived in 1996 by the 
multilateral donor community to help the most indebted and poorest developing 
countries escape their development trap (Addison et al 2004). HIPC assistance is 
determined by bringing the net present value of external public debt down to a critical 
threshold. The key threshold was specified initially as a debt-to-export ratio of between 
200 and 250 per cent. 
The initiative was revised in 1999 (IMF and World Bank 1999) because of ongoing 
controversies over its modes of operation and its effectiveness (Fedelino and Kudina 
2003, Hjertholm 2003, IDA and IMF 2001, Sanford 2004, Sun 2004). The enhanced 
HIPC initiative allowed for broader and deeper debt relief (covering more countries and 
cutting more debt), accelerated debt relief (granting debt relief at the decision point and 
brining the completion point forward), and strengthened the link between debt relief and 
poverty alleviation (adopting poverty reduction strategy papers, PRSPs, which prioritize 
the use of freed resources for poverty alleviation). However, the revisions did not 
account for the unique circumstances of war-affected HIPCs (for a rare exception, see 
IMF and World Bank 2001). These circumstances are outlined and discussed below. 
Even in peaceful economies, the assessment of long-term debt sustainability should 
shift from a single debt indicator to a more complex and comprehensive system of 
indicators (IDA and IMF 2001). There are three key determinants of sustainability: the 
existing stock of debt, the development of fiscal and external debt management 
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sustainability and the development process generally require the analysis of policies, 
institutions, exogenous factors and debt management over the long-term. 
However, the strong focus of the HIPC initiative on a narrow and short-term range of 
debt sustainability indicators may be misleading or even counter productive in a post-
war economy. On the one hand, private financial flows in the form of remittances of 
returning flight capital might be important for funding development in post-war 
countries. These sources of funding are not currently included in the HIPC debt 
sustainability analyses. On the other hand, given that civil wars always weaken the state 
and its ability to raise taxes (see above), the levels of domestically mobilized public 
resources will be even lower in a war-affected developing country than in other 
developing countries. 
Furthermore, the weakness of institutions in war-affected countries implies that export 
revenues may be accruing to non-state and even non-taxable actors, thus weakening the 
ability to service debts. This point is particularly acute if these exports are recorded in 
the statistics. This suggests that debt as a share of exports may be a less useful, if not an 
overly optimistic, indicator for assessing debt sustainability than it is in peaceful HIPCs. 
The HIPC initiative effectively aims to maximize the consistent repayment of albeit 
reduced debts, thus potentially placing a stronger fiscal burden in terms of its debt 
payments on countries emerging from war and international isolation (like Uganda and 
Mozambique) than for countries remaining isolated (like Sudan or Liberia). Therefore, 
such high debt service burden in absolute (measured in dollars per capita) and relative 
(measured in share of total spending) terms may reduce the fiscal peace dividend and 
hence prosperity in such a weak state. It is crucial for the peace process that there is a 
peace dividend in terms of public spending, poverty reduction and output growth. If 
debt service payments increased by more than military spending fell (assuming that 
demobilization programs do allow a reduction in military spending at all), then this may 
be a high price to pay for rejoining the international community. 
Linked to the low share of government in the economy is the issue of weak institutional 
capacities in post-war economies. While this limited capacity indicates the need for 
flexibility in assessing the track record, it is important that the link between debt relief 
and effective poverty reduction policies is not weakened. More generally, the 
assessment of track records in post-conflict countries should extend beyond 
macroeconomic stability and also pay attention to consolidating peace, security and 
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sustainability should then use both quantitative indicators of economic and poverty 
alleviation performance but could also include qualitative information, for example to 
address the issue of odious debt (see below). 
The need for a stable, medium-term track record is a key element of the HIPC initiative. 
However, the usual requirement for a three-year period of good policy seems 
problematic for countries keen to escape the conflict trap. For countries with a good 
prospect for peace, it is worth dropping or reducing the time lag between the decision 
and the completion points, and front-loading a large amount of debt relief so that the 
government has additional resources to offer for redressing grievances. This assumes 
that the peace dividend is large enough to compensate successfully for the foregone 
revenue from conflict businesses (Addison and Murshed 2003). 
The analysis of the HIPC initiative from the point of view of conflict economies 
suggests that post-conflict economies require both new forms of conditionality and an 
enhanced scale of debt relief. The fact that war-affected HIPCs include some of the 
worst performers in terms of foreign debt and human development do not change our 
conclusions, instead they sharpen them. 
5. CASE STUDY EVIDENCE 
Mozambique: The Paradox of High Debt and High Aid 
Mozambique, which had only become independent in 1975 following years of warfare, 
suffered another devastating conflict from the early 1980s till the end of 1992, when a 
peace accord ended the civil war (Newitt 1995). The aim of the rebels had been to 
destroy the capacity of the then socialist government, formed by the Frelimo party, to 
direct the country. In rural areas in particular the rebels generally fulfilled that objective. 
Since the end of the war, the country has turned to multi-party democracy, with the 
Frelimo party democratically winning all presidential and parliamentary elections. This 
has ensured a high degree of political consistency both internally and in dealing with 
donors. 
The economy was badly damaged by both conflicts (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1996; 
Addison and de Sousa 1999). GNI per capita was USD 650 in 1993 (Table 6) and the 
national poverty headcount of Mozambique was 69.4 per cent in 1996 (Government of 
Mozambique 1998; Government of Mozambique 2004). Since then, Mozambique has 
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1995 to 2002 was 5.6 per cent (World Bank 2005). GNI per capita rose to USD 990 in 
2002 while the national poverty headcount of Mozambique dropped to 54.1 per cent in 
the same year. 
Mozambique’s exports of goods and services per capita increased slowly throughout the 
1990s and accelerated in recent years. However, much of the increase in the mid-1990s 
was based on an improvement in export prices of prawns, cotton and cashew, and on the 
start of electricity exports from the Cahora Bassa dam to Zimbabwe in 1998 (Falck 
1999). The external financial balance of Mozambique since the end of the war was 
supported by a high and rising level of foreign aid. 
Until the late 1970s, Mozambique did not accumulate noteworthy amounts of external 
debt. During the first years of independence, the reduction of foreign reserves was 
sufficient to finance the current account deficit. However, shortly after stepping into its 
prolonged civil war, Mozambique’s external debt increased rapidly and soon became 
unsustainable. Even though Mozambique, in contrast to other conflict-affected 
countries, did not entirely stop servicing its debt during the war, significant principal 
arrears vis-à-vis official creditors accumulated during this period. By 1993, 
Mozambique’s debt-to-GNI ratio reached nearly 300 per cent and the external debt-to-
export ratio even added up to 1400 per cent (Table 6). These tremendously high ratios 
did not only reflect a high increase of debt accumulated during war but also strongly 
reduced output indicators. 
Until the early 1980s, the loans were primarily granted by the Eastern bloc and by oil-
exporting countries. The Soviet Union, for example, was one of the main lenders. 
Commercial debt was of little consequence for Mozambique. After the ruling Frelimo 
party formally abandoned Marxism in 1989 and a new constitution paved the way for a 
free market economy, multilateral institutions, particularly the World Bank and the 
IMF, became the main lenders. Thus, public and publicly guaranteed long-term 
multilateral debt stock doubled in only four years, reaching nearly USD 700 million in 
1992. However, despite a significant modification of Mozambique’s composition of 
external debt, the share of concessional debt remained constant and at a very high level 
by the end of the civil war. 
Mozambique thus experienced the paradoxical situation of being one of the most highly 
indebted but at the same time most aid-receiving developing countries in the world. The 
case of Mozambique including war, declining incomes, rising poverty and increasing 
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studied in isolation from debt. In fact, debt accumulation during conflict as well as the 
importance of peace for development should be addressed by donors explicitly. 
While Mozambique appears to have build strong debt management structures, the 
frequency of its debt rescheduling (for example for the Paris Club - Table 3) suggests 
that a leaner debt operation might have saved scarce human capital for more productive 
tasks. While the opportunity costs of not having a debt management capacity are large 
(as argued in the case of the DRC), the opportunity costs of having an overextended 
debt management capacity in response to donors’ demands also entails important 
opportunity costs for an impoverished developing country. 
In comparison to other post-war economies, Mozambique received above average debt 
relief totaling an estimated USD 4.3 billion. In addition, a commercial debt buy-back 
operation in December 1991 eliminated USD 203 million of debt, of which USD 119 
million were outstanding interest arrears (Dijkstra 2003). Extra resources from debt 
relief granted in 2001 started to be allocated through the fiscal system and into basic 
social expenditures (including into the strengthening of the disbursing fiscal and social 
institutions), and thus helped to redress some of the regional inequalities in living 
standards. 
Aid flows remained relatively stable over the 1990s, but declined after 1995 (Table 5). 
However, in 2002 aid doubled as a consequence of the flood in 2001. During the 1990s, 
with the exception of 1990, aid and debt forgiveness ran more or less parallel. In 
particular, above average debt forgiveness did not result in decreasing aid flows. From 
1999 on, however, aid and debt forgiveness ceased to move in the same direction. Yet 
significant debt forgiveness resulted in only very small decreases of aid flows. Overall, 
Mozambique has very slowly escaped the paradox of being highly indebted and highly 
aid-dependent. 
Uganda: Slow Road to Debt Reconciliation 
Uganda has suffered a series of internal and international conflicts and political coups in 
its recent history (see Nannyonjo 2005). The current president, Yoweri Museveni, led a 
rebel group which came to power in 1986, ending the country’s civil war. He has since 
cautiously moved the country to a managed form of democracy and cooperates close 
with multilateral and bilateral donors. Uganda’s GNI per capita has increased from 974 
USD in 1989 to 1370 USD in 2002 (Table 7). Internationally, Uganda has been actively 
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groups (including the Lord’s Resistance Army) have terrorized the North of the country 
since 1986. 
While Uganda’s external debt started increasing in the 1970s, the rapid rise of the 
country’s debt stock to unsustainable levels began in the early 1980s (Table 7). One of 
the major factors contributing to Uganda’s huge external debt was the high and 
expansionary fiscal policy incurred by successive Governments, mainly to finance the 
civil war (Barungi and Atingi 2000). In fact Uganda’s external debt stock during the 
war of 1981 to 1988 grew by 14 per cent a year on average, while it grew by 6 per cent 
a year on average during the 1990s. 
There is a striking modification in the composition of external debt from 1980 to 1989. 
In the period before the war, Uganda borrowed mainly from private creditors followed 
by bilateral official creditors; multilateral debt in 1980 accounted for only 11 per cent of 
total debt. Given the nature of war finance in Uganda, this may suggest that donors 
implicitly enabled the continuation of the war. Yet during the war, borrowing from 
multilateral creditors increased sharply both in absolute and relative terms, thus 
accounting for about 45 per cent of total debt in 1989. 
When Uganda emerged from war, the country had built up significant arrears on its 
bilateral and commercial debt payment obligations. The commercial creditors accounted 
for the largest part of arrears, followed by Non-Paris Club creditors, such as India, 
Yugoslavia, and Tanzania, with the latter being a player in the Ugandan conflict as well. 
However, compared to the other conflict-affected countries, arrears were not as large. 
In the case of Uganda, donors and the government had to find piece-meal options for 
dealing with debt, because 17 per cent of the level of uninsured commercial debt of 
Uganda could not be rescheduled as a number of loans were owed to contractors who 
had work in progress or the loans were secured in various ways. Furthermore, 42 per 
cent of the debt owed to Paris Club governments was contracted after July 1, 1981. New 
debt contracted after that cut-off date is not considered by the Paris Club for 
rescheduling or reduction. Finally, the preponderance of multilateral debt severely 
limited the benefits that Uganda could achieve through traditional rescheduling, since 
multilateral organizations do not reschedule debt. This section will therefore review and 
assess the options used by Uganda to deal with commercial, bilateral and multilateral 
debt (Table 7). 
21 As part of its debt rescheduling efforts, the Government of Uganda restructured its 
commercial debt. Uganda converted some of the debt into equity, rescheduled a portion 
of the debt, and discharged the remainder in a buy-back operation at a significant 
discount to face value of 88 per cent. This was financed by the IDA-Only Debt 
Reduction Facility, with co-financing from the governments of Germany, Netherlands 
and Switzerland (Kapoor 1995). Funds from the facility were provided to eligible 
countries on a grant basis, largely to finance the cash-buy back of commercial debt. 
While concern has sometimes been expressed that buy-back operations at a deep 
discount could affect a country’s ability to obtain access to short-term credit on 
reasonable terms in the future, in the case of Uganda the magnitude of these arrears, and 
the government’s inability to settle them, had already reduced the government’s access 
to short-term credit and trade lines. 
The first debt treatments between Uganda and the Paris Club took place in 1981-82, 
covering USD 40 million (corresponding to nearly 6 per cent of total debt) and USD 19 
million (over 2 per cent of total debt) under classic terms (Table 3). These were 
followed by operations on ad-hoc terms in 1987 and operations on Toronto terms in 
1989. Thus, Uganda managed to enter in negotiations with the Paris Club during its 
civil war. 
The remaining arrears were to non-Paris Club bilateral creditors. The final element of 
the debt strategy hence focused on non-OECD bilateral creditors who were owed a 
significant amount of arrears and penalty charges, which were still outstanding after 
Paris Club arrears had been cleared. The authorities contacted the respective creditors 
with a view to receiving terms at least comparable to Naples terms. An agreement was 
reached with Tanzania on the settlement of Uganda’s arrears. At the time this paper was 
written, Uganda had no arrears the Paris Club or with multilateral creditors (with 
exception of BADEA where the matter is in dispute). 
Uganda has benefited from debt relief from the international community since the mid-
1980s. However, apart from an IDA-funded commercial debt buyback in 1992, only 
bilateral Paris Club creditors were willing to offer debt relief until the mid 1990s. Their 
relief had only a modest impact on Uganda’s overall debt position, as by 1994 70 per 
cent of Uganda’s debt was owed to multilateral creditors. Furthermore Paris Club debt 
relief can only apply to debts contracted before 1981. 
22 In 1995 a number of bilateral donors set up a Multilateral Debt Fund for Uganda, into 
which they paid funds in order to help Uganda repay its debt obligations to multilateral 
creditors. Further external arrears to multilateral creditors were cleared either through 
concessional rescheduling (USD 10.6 million from the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa, BADEA) or in cash payments (amounting to USD 4.9 million) 
by March 1998. 
Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under both the first HIPC and the 
enhanced HIPC initiative. Before assistance for Uganda under the HIPC initiative was 
granted, the NPV of debt-to-export ratio at end June 1997 stood at 243 per cent. The 
country did not have to go through a standard six-year qualifying period. Instead, in 
April 1997, the Executive Board of IDA and the Fund decided in principle on Uganda’s 
qualification for assistance under the HIPC initiative on a one-year interval to reach the 
completion point and on the amounts of their respective assistance at the completion 
point subject to satisfactory assurances of participation by Uganda’s other creditors. 
The year in which Uganda first received debt relief under the HIPC initiative was 1998. 
In total, as a result of both initiatives, Uganda was granted debt relief amounting to 
USD 1 billion in NPV terms to be delivered over a period of twenty years. As a 
consequence Uganda received substantial cash savings, averaging USD 60 million per 
annum over four years, accounting for almost a quarter of the total budget support over 
the period. The Ugandan case thus contrasts with the case of the DRC where bilateral 
Paris Club debt was more important. 
The HIPC initiative for Uganda left room for involving a variety of donors. The African 
Development Bank and the IMF participated in the HIPC initiative through the HIPC 
Trust Fund, which was set up and funded by donors to support the HIPC initiative over 
and above the donors’ legal obligations. This enabled the buy back of most of the AfDB 
loans with own contributions, as well as through donor contributions. The Nordic 
Development Fund (NDF) also participated in the HIPC Trust Fund by paying debt 
service falling due on behalf of the debtor rather than through a debt buyback. BADEA 
agreed with the Ugandan authorities to provide its HIPC assistance through a 
concessional rescheduling of arrears, over ten years with two years grace at zero 
interest. Such different initiatives can combine to make a strong impact on a country’s 
indebtedness, though the coordination costs for the Ugandan government are probably 
significant. 
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community and their conflict histories, had very different treatments by the HIPC 
initiative. Mozambique received a larger share of debt relief both as a share of total debt 
and as a share of GNI in the original initiative and in the enhanced initiative. In the 
former, Mozambique was treated more generously while in the latter Uganda caught up 
somewhat in terms of receiving some substantial debt relief as well. The dimensions of 
all these treatments were exceeded by the terms agreed with the DRC. 
Looking at the debt forgiven to Uganda and the grants this country received from 
abroad, it seems that debt relief was generally additional to other aid, although there 
were some exceptions in 1993 and 1998. The overall trend was an increase in the 
provision of grants in the first half of the nineties, with a slight decline after 1995, but 
an increase again after 1999. As in the case of Mozambique, debt relief in Uganda did 
not come along with an substantial increase of net resource flows (accounting for new 
debt and aid). This augurs badly for the “flow” effect of the HIPC initiative. 
Overall, the case of Uganda shows how slow and painstaking the process of debt 
reconciliation can be for post-conflict countries even under comparable favorable 
institutional circumstances. In part, this is because the complexities of the negotiations 
bind scarce capacities. In part, this is because rules and institutions are very complex 
and each agreement covers only a small part of the problem. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Fast but Unsustainable Action 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suffered several devastating wars in its 
recent history, with one conflict lasting from 1996 to 2001. This war resulted in 3 
million deaths and affected the lives of up to 100 million people (Clément 2004). The 
DRC, formerly known as Zaire, is one of Africa’s most resource-rich countries which 
has suffered from domestic and international mismanagement and corruption. Western 
support for the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko eventually dried up in the early 
1990s. Mobutu was overthrown by Laurent Kabila in 1997, who in turn was 
assassinated in 2001. His son Joseph Kabila followed him into office and realigned the 
country with the multilateral donor community. The DRC continues to be characterized 
by ongoing political instability and extreme poverty. The DRC’s GNI per capita 
dropped from USD 1,479 in 1991 to USD 630 in 2001 (Table 8). 
In the DRC, external debt rose significantly during the regime of President Mobutu. His 
regime relied profoundly on external financing to maintain itself in power (Ndikumana 
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abroad. Even though external borrowing slowed substantially after 1994, the DRC’s 
external debt stock remained at a very high level, reflecting in part the sharp increase of 
arrears in the 1990s. Initially, the DRC’s borrowing was mainly from private creditors. 
As the private creditors started to shorten their exposure to the country after the debt 
crisis of 1976, official borrowing increased in the 1980s. In 1981 the IMF provided the 
country with the largest credit to an African country in the IMF’s history, and in 1987 
another IMF credit was approved. The latter was granted under pressure from the US 
government and despite strong objections from senior IMF staff. 
There were nearly no disbursements during the civil war. Nonetheless, by 2001 the 
DRC’s external debt amounted to USD 11.7 billion, with arrears accounting for 70 per 
cent of the total (Table 8). According to the Congolese government, war-related 
expenditure and a sharp decline in the collection of revenue resulting from weakened 
state institutions resulted in a significant fiscal deficit, which had to be financed through 
the accumulation of domestic and external arrears. The overall deficit of the 
government, for example, amounted to 45 per cent of revenue in 1998 and 81 per cent in 
2000. The increasing amount of arrears is also reflected in the dramatic change in the 
ratio of long-term to short-term debt. 
Since early 2001, the DRC has made some progress towards peace. In contrast to other 
conflict-affected countries, the international community and in particular the IMF 
adopted quite a proactive and speedy approach to debt relief. In February 2001, an IMF 
mission visited Kinshasa and in December 2001 a meeting of donors, with the 
participation of a Congolese delegation, took place in Paris to gather support from the 
international community. Already at the beginning of 2002, the IMF sent a mission to 
negotiate a medium-term program that would be supported by a three-year arrangement 
under the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility. However, it will be shown below that this 
fast moving approach was not matched by progress on other economic, political and 
institutional fronts, thus squandering an opportunity to translate debt relief into peace 
building and sustainable development. 
Debt reconciliation between the DRC and the international community began in 2001 
during several joint IDA-IMF missions based on late 2000 debt statistics. Furthermore, 
a meeting of donors took place in Paris in December 2001 with the participation of a 
Congolese delegation. After the end of the war, it took one year to reach an agreement 
concerning the clearance of arrears. By end of 2003, the loan-by-loan debt 
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the BDEGL. Given that the war had only ended in 2000, this was a remarkably fast 
process, which had been made possible also due to the good personal relationships of 
the national and international negotiators. Overall, about 83 per cent of the net present 
value of the DRC’s total stock of external debt outstanding at end 2002 was reconciled 
by August 2003, when the HIPC decision point document for the DRC was finalized 
(Table 4). 
To build good relations and prior to reaching a formal debt agreement, the DRC 
authorities committed to deposit SDR 100.000 per month starting in 2001 into an 
account of the DRC held with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). These 
deposits continued to be part of the DRC’s international reserves until their eventual use 
for arrear clearance. The account was closely monitored by the IMF. The amount 
chosen was relatively low given that the stabilization of the DRC’s arrears to the Fund 
would have implied monthly payments of about SDR 1 million. However, in deciding 
on the amount of SDR 100.000 the IMF staff was guided by the readiness of the IMF’s 
board to accept reduced payments by a post-conflict member in arrears, thus 
recognizing the DRC’s limited debt service capacity. This unusual treatment required 
that the DRC was judged to be cooperating and that all other multilateral donors, to 
which the DRC was in arrears, took comparable action. 
While these measures were implemented fairly quickly and with a high degree of 
flexibility shown by both sides, on the institutional side of debt management the DRC 
exhibited ongoing weaknesses in this period. The IMF Country Report 03/267 found 
that the principal agency charged with handling debt issues still did not have the 
technical and financial means to fulfill its mandate as of August 2003. The DRC lacked 
a clear process for the formulation of debt policies and debt statistics were not 
published. 
The DRC hence represents a case where post-war credibility was built fairly quickly. 
However, the opportunities offered by this progress were subsequently not fully 
exploited. The DRC government failed to develop a coherent debt management strategy 
and capacity, thus missing out on further chances to mobilize international financial 
support for its urgent reconstruction needs. In part, this failure may be explained by the 
apparent lack of national capacity. Yet given the positive start to these negotiations, it 
should have been possible to build national capacity with donor support. In the end, the 
remarkable progress made on the initial phases of the debt management process was not 
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2003) that the willingness of a country and donors to implement debt relief is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for converting debt relief into development, 
with strong state institutions being one of the other necessary ingredients for success. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We analyze the role of and the institutions for external debt in post-conflict developing 
countries. We first show that external debt in post-conflict countries exhibits different 
patterns and is more substantial than for non-conflict economies. There are other 
significant differences between conflict and non-conflict developing countries, such as 
the increased levels of uncertainty in the post-war period, the higher financial needs for 
reconstruction, the higher dependence on foreign aid, and the normative issue of odious 
debt. Furthermore, conflict countries as a group exhibit worse debt sustainability 
indicators than non-conflict countries. In light of these substantial differences it is 
surprising that we find that existing debt relief strategies by private, bilateral and 
multilateral lenders mostly do not take account of this special status of post-conflict 
economies. 
One message following from our analysis is that clearing arrears with multilateral 
donors in the post-conflict period is key to normalizing relations with donors. However, 
this process is very fragile and requires strong political commitment by both sides, 
foresight and trust by the donors and relatively high institutional capacity by the 
borrower. Otherwise, even successful debt reconciliation may not yield successful post-
conflict development, as was demonstrated for the case of DRC. 
In Mozambique, Uganda and the DRC debt relief and grant flows did not behave as 
substitutes. Countries that received more debt relief also received more aid; 
Mozambique being the front runner. The HIPC debt relief for both Mozambique and 
Uganda appears to have been additional to aid. However, part of this story may be 
related to some countries in some years benefiting from their “moment in the sun”. That 
is, some countries may benefit from special, temporary circumstances of either a 
positive (an election) or a negative nature (a natural disaster), which forces the donors to 
grant above average debt relief and/or aid disbursements. 
Debt for post-conflict economies has become multilateralised in recent years. Yet the 
HIPC initiative was not designed to benefit post-conflict economies quickly once their 
fighting ended. Given that the wars in Mozambique and Uganda had ended before the 
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quickly as the DRC could some five years later. In the cases of Mozambique and 
Uganda, it is not clear why the enhanced HIPC initiative required another period of 
track record of the recipient countries given that each had completed a track record both 
before and after the first decision point in the late 1990s. If these two successful 
developing economies are required to fulfill these stringent requirements, then it is clear 
that more vulnerable post-conflict economies will find it even more difficult to comply 
with HIPC conditionality. In particular, it is important to make cautious assumptions 
concerning the suitable level and the choice of debt sustainability indicators. Given the 
possible interdependency of peace and prosperity, taking a broader view on financing 
reconstruction is strongly advisable. We recommend for donors to consider granting 
debt relief even before the fighting ends, thus accelerating the effective relief. This will 
require new political commitments to advance planning in debt relief by donors to an 
extent that does not currently exist. Post-conflict countries should therefore receive 
special treatment under the HIPC initiative, with faster and deeper debt relief linked to 
broader policy conditionality. Specifically, sustainability criteria should be defined both 
quantitatively and qualitatively (including issues of peace sustainability), conditions 
could be forward looking instead of being backward looking (again including peace 
conditionality), and the track record could be shortened or abolished depending on 
individual circumstances and may even start during a war. Furthermore, both recipient 
and donor countries would require policy making capacity to deal with these issues. In 
short, we find that war-affected HIPCs currently are not well treated by the HIPC 
initiative as it does not account properly of their special needs and circumstances. 
There is an imperfect regulatory framework in place at the moment at the global level 
concerning the adjudication of so-called odious debt, which admittedly is a normative 
issue. In the contexts of recent high-profile regime changes, such as the post-conflict 
economies of Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus of the debt sustainability analysis has 
increasingly shifted from the responsibilities of the borrowers towards the 
responsibilities of the lenders for ensuring that debt is used sustainable. We therefore 
propose to establish the policy instrument of “debt sanctions” to strengthen the ex ante 
regulatory framework for debt relief. An international institution such as the United 
Nations should be given the mandate to declare a regime odious and thus withdraw 
from future lenders the right to enforce debt repayments on debts contracted after that 
day. Institutionalizing such form of political rating on governments would signal to 
investors that lending unsustainably carries a high risk of genuine default and would 
28 prevent war-mongering, cleptocratic or oppressive regimes from financing their 
activities with new loans. Arguably, the international donor community is not yet well 
prepared for such forms of conditionality and the types of comprehensive policies and 
monitoring it would require. However, from the point of view of poverty alleviation, 
growth and peace in developing countries, such new policy instrument merits a lot of 
attention. 
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  number of cases  debt/GNI (%)  debt/Export (%)  aid/GNI (%) 
Debt/GNI (%) 
LICs (all)  38  127.3  432.7  15.4 
LICs (no conflict)  18  116.0  328.0  13.2 
LICs (in war)  3  116.4  1,292.1  11.2 
LICs (post-war)  17  161.1  436.0  21.6 
GNI = gross national income. 
LIC = low-income country. 
Sources: Global Development Finance and World Development Finance, World Bank and own 
calculations. 
Note:   Only severely and moderately indebted low-income countries for which data were 




Table 1b: Composition of Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt  
as percentage of total public and publicly guaranteed debt 
    Country-Group 1990 1991                        1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Multilateral Creditors                                        
conflict-affected (average)  20.1  21.2  26.1  24.3                   
                 
                      
                  
                          
                           
25.7 27.5 28.8 30.4 31.3 35.0 35.5 38.3 40.8
no conflict (average)  28.5  30.3  33.5  35.1  36.0 37.3 38.2 40.2 40.9 41.7 42.4 43.1 45.8
Bilateral Official Creditors 
conflict-affected  (average) 59 58 61 56 56 56 55 55 54 50 50 47 45
no  conflict  (average) 53 53 55 54 53 52 52 48 48 48 49 50 48
Sources: Global Development Finance, World Development Finance, World Bank, and own 
calculations. 
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Table 2: Paris Club Terms 
Terms   Year of agreement  Debt cancellation?  Still in current use? 
Classic terms    no, but longer repayment period yes, standard treatment 
Toronto terms   1988  up to 33.3%  no  
Houston terms  1990  no, but longer repayment period yes, for highly indebted lower-middle-income countries
London terms   1991  up to 50%  no  
Naples terms  1994  up to 67%  yes, for highly indebted poor countries 
Lyon terms   1996  up to 80%  no 
Cologne terms  1999  up to 90%  yes, for countries eligible for the HIPC Initiative 
 
  2Table 3: Paris Club Reschedulings: Mozambique, Uganda, and DRC 
  Mozambique 
Cut off date: February 01, 1984 
  Uganda 
Cut-off Date: July 01, 1981 
  Democratic Republic of Congo  
Cut-off Date: June 30, 1983 
  Amounts treated in 
US$ million 
Amounts treated as 
percentage of total 
amount of debt 
Terms of 
treatment 
  Amounts treated in 
US$ million 
Amounts treated as 
percentage of total 
amount of debt 
Terms of 
treatment 
  Amounts treated in 
US$ million 
Amounts treated as 
percentage of total 
amount of debt 
Terms of 
treatment 
1980                     
1981        40  5.69  classic terms    600  11.78  classic terms 
1982        19  2.18  classic terms         
1983                1,490  27.93  classic terms 
1984  142  9.87  classic terms               
1985                322  5.21  classic terms 
1986                350  4.87  classic terms 
1987  612  14.83  ad hoc  256  13.33  ad hoc    883  10.06  ad hoc 
1988                     
1989        90  4.13  Toronto terms    x  x  Toronto terms 
1990  707  15.21  Toronto terms               
1991                     
1992        38  1.30  London terms         
1993  440  8.44  London terms               
1994                     
1995        110  3.07  Naples terms         
1996  663  8.76  Naples terms               
1997                     
1998  x  x  Lyon terms  147  3.75  Lyon terms         
1999  1,860  26.66  Lyon terms               
2000        147  4.20  Cologne terms         
2001  2,800*  61.35  Cologne terms               
2002                8,980**  89.27  Naples terms 
                     
Notes 
    
*  Out of the US$ 2,800 million treated, US$ 2,270 million were cancelled and US$ 530 million rescheduled. 
**  US$ 4640 million were cancelled, and US$ 4,340 million rescheduled. Cologne terms given for maturities falling due from July 2003 through June 2005. 
x  Data on the details of the reschedulings in these years are unavailable. 
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Table 4: HIPC Relief: Mozambique, Uganda, and DRC 
 
  Original HIPC Initiative    Enhanced HIPC Initiative 

















Mozambique  3,700  44.6  101.0  April 1998  June 1999    600  8.5  17.4  April 2000 
September 
2001 
Uganda  650  16.8  10.4  April 1997  April 1998    1,300  37.1  22.6 
February 
2000  May 2000 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo  ..                  .. .. .. ..   10,389 93.0 192.9 July  2003  Floating
* Status as of March 2005 
 
 
  4Table 5: Debt Relief & Aid Grants: Mozambique, Uganda, and DRC 
US$ million, unless otherwise indicated 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mozambique                 
total rescheduling  0.00 343.20 141.40 375.60 134.20 135.70 218.90 186.70 114.30 229.00 469.40 1.60 268.90 0.00 0.00
total forgiveness (incl. interest forgiven)  0.00 1,174.10 236.70 23.50 35.80 63.30 322.80 130.80 223.10 27.90 535.50 46.20 2,556.00 34.80 83.40
total debt relief  0.00 1,517.30 378.10 399.10 170.00 199.00 541.70 317.50 337.40 256.90 1,004.90 47.80 2,824.90 34.80 83.40
total debt relief as % of debt stock  0.0 33.6 9.3 13.6 4.0 3.6 5.2 4.3 4.7 7.5 17.3 0.7 62.4 0.7 1.7
total debt relief as a % of GNI  0.00 65.39 16.48 23.75 9.38 10.03 25.40 11.88 10.49 7.01 26.61 1.38 90.24 1.02 2.03
grants (incl. technical cooperation)  672.13 841.48 1,001.08 920.29 860.93 876.20 1,003.15 630.57 680.13 824.44 781.60 898.80 822.20 1,871.68 829.69
grants as percentage of GNI  31.55 36.27 43.64 54.77 47.49 44.16 47.04 23.59 21.14 22.51 20.70 26.03 26.27 54.90 20.20
Uganda                 
total rescheduling  28.80 4.50 6.40 91.80 34.40 0.00 172.00 0.00 0.00 158.40 18.40 37.50 0.00 1.20 19.00
total forgiveness (incl. interest forgiven)  0.30 51.20 1.00 14.40 156.40 6.90 40.50 0.00 0.00 626.70 11.00 189.10 33.30 128.30 39.70
total debt relief  29.10 55.70 7.40 106.20 190.80 6.90 212.50 0.00 0.00 785.10 29.40 226.60 33.30 129.50 58.70
total debt relief as % of debt stock  2.8 2.6 0.4 3.9 6.4 0.2 5.9 0.0 0.0 19.8 0.9 6.4 0.9 3.2 1.4
total debt relief as a % of GNI  0.56 1.32 0.23 3.83 6.02 0.18 3.73 0.00 0.00 12.03 0.49 3.94 0.60 2.26 0.95
grants (incl. technical cooperation)  264.15 348.35 419.67 454.75 381.32 439.76 547.71 467.44 492.23 483.00 489.11 658.73 512.30 576.81 694.04
grants as percentage of GNI  5.07 8.24 12.86 16.41 12.02 11.19 9.61 7.79 7.87 7.40 8.22 11.46 9.25 10.04 11.26
Democratic Republic of Congo                 
total rescheduling  975.60 390.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.90 0.00 0.00 3,518.30 79.00
total forgiveness (incl. interest forgiven)  152.90 24.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.00 3,553.30 101.80
total debt relief  1,128.50 414.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.50 0.00 0.00 7,071.60 180.80
total debt relief as % of debt stock  15.43 4.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 83.13 0.91
total debt relief as a % of GNI  13.48 4.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 134.72 3.36
grants (incl. technical cooperation)  364.76 519.68 584.09 196.45 131.32 258.88 216.26 182.12 161.91 137.12 152.09 191.39 269.43 565.63 4,934.43
grants as percentage of GNI  4.36 6.06 7.01 2.39 1.32 5.05 4.43 3.37 2.84 2.36 3.52 4.89 6.03 10.78 91.63
GNI = gross national income. 
Source: World  Bank  Global Development Finance database and own calculations. 
Notes:  Total forgiveness corresponds to the change in debt stock due to debt forgiveness or reduction, including principal and interest arrears forgiven. 
Total debt relief includes total debt rescheduling in addition to forgiveness.  
 
  5Table 6: Debt Summary – Mozambique 
US$ million, unless otherwise indicated 
  Last Pre-War 1984  First Post-War 1993 Most recent  
2002 
  Last Pre-War 1984  First Post-War 1993 Most recent  
2002 
Total debt stocks  1,438  5,212          4,609 Debt  indicators
Long-term debt outstanding  1,354  4,859  4,039  Total debt /exports of goods and services (%)  673  1,402  363 
Short-term debt outstanding  84  164  371  Total debt /GNI (%)  43  287  135 
of which interest arrears, official creditors  4  145  243  Total debt service (% of GNI)   1  7  2 
of which interest arrears, private creditors              3 2 Debt  composition 
Principal arrears, official creditors   46  731  189  Multilateral debt/total debt (%)   4  15  32 
Principal arrears, private creditors   1  49  2  Bilateral PPG debt/total PPG debt (%)  78.3  80.5  44.2 
Total Debt Flows        Private PPG debt/total debt PPG (%)  17.1  3.0  0.1 
Disbursements  834  186  270  Aid and GNI       
Disbursement multilateral %  0.6  77.5  89.1  Aid (% of GNI)   8  65  60 
Disbursement bilateral %  75.3  20.3  10.2  Aid per capita (current US$)   19  79  112 
Disbursement private %  24.1  2.3  0.0  GNI, PPP (real 2002 million $)  7,647  9,793  18,293 
Net transfers on debt  817  20  41  GNI per capita, PPP (real 2002  $)  565  652  990 
 
PPG = public and publicly guaranteed debt.  
GNI = gross national income.  
PPP = purchasing power parity-adjusted. 
 
  6Table 7: Debt Summary – Uganda 
US$ million, unless otherwise indicated 
  Last Pre-War 1980  First Post-War 1989 Most recent  
2002 
  Last Pre-War 1980  First Post-War 1989 Most recent  
2002 
Total debt stocks  687  2,177  4,100  Debt indicators     
Long-term debt outstanding  535  1,846  3,690  Total debt /exports of goods and services (%)  208  1,402  363 
Short-term debt outstanding  63  105  153  Total debt /GNI(%)  43  287  135 
of which interest arrears, official creditors  10  22  79  Total debt service (% of GNI)   1  7  2 
of which interest arrears, private 
creditors  9              33 2 Debt  composition
Principal arrears, official creditors   30  51  200  Multilateral debt/total debt (%)   12  45  77 
Principal arrears, private creditors   52  83  28  Bilateral PPG debt/total PPG debt (%)  39.6  28.7  10.5 
Total debt flows        Private PPG debt/total PPG debt (%)  45.6  18.1  0.8 
Disbursements  83  312  162  Aid and GNI       
Disbursement multilateral %  8.2  46.4  84.0  Aid (% of GNI)   9  9  11 
Disbursement bilateral %  13.3  40.4  12.8  Aid per capita (current US$)   9  27  26 
Disbursement private %  78.4  13.1  3.3  GNI, PPP (real 2002 million $)    16,288  33,819 
Net transfers on debt  118  187  93  GNI per capita, PPP (real 2002  $)  ..  974  1,370 
 
PPG = public and publicly guaranteed debt.  
GNI = gross national income.  
PPP = purchasing power parity-adjusted. 
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Table 8: Debt Summary – Democratic Republic of Congo   
US$ million, unless otherwise indicated 
  Last Pre-War 1996  First Post-War 2001 Most recent  
2002 
  Last Pre-War 1991  First Post-War 2001 Most recent  
2002 
Total debt stocks  10,840  11,519  8,726          Debt  Indicators
Long-term debt outstanding  9,285  7,587  7,391  Total debt /exports of goods and services (%)   130  ..  .. 
Short-term debt outstanding  1,083  3,556  764  Total debt /GNI(%)  2  241  159 
of which interest arrears, official creditors  585  2,997  409  Total debt service (% of GNI)   20  ..  17 
of which interest arrears, private creditors 108          178 53  Debt  composition 
Principal arrears, official creditors   376  4,798  578  Multilateral debt/total debt (%)   20  18  28 
Principal arrears, private creditors   674  488  482  Bilateral PPG debt/total PPG debt (%)  66.9  66.3  68.5 
Total debt flows        Private PPG debt/total PPG debt (%)  9.4  6.4  3.9 
Disbursements  3  0  415  Aid and GNI       
Disbursement multilateral %  0  0  98.7  Aid (% of GNI)   6  6  15 
Disbursement bilateral %  100  0  1.3  Aid per capita (current US$)  12  5  16 
Disbursement private %  0  0  0  GNI, PPP (real 2002 million $)  56,977  31,605  32,697 
Net transfers on debt  0  0  0  GNI per capita, PPP (real 2002 $)  1,479  630  630 
 
PPG = public and publicly guaranteed debt.  
GNI = gross national income.  
PPP = purchasing power parity-adjusted. 
 
 